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Crime, Punishment, and Romero: An Analysis of the
Case Against California's Three Strikes Law
Brian P Janiskee* and Edward J. Erler**
INTRODUCTION
In November 1999, the Institute of Governmental Studies at the
University of California, Berkeley, released a study by Franklin E.
Zimring, Sam Kamin, and Gordon Hawkins entitled Crime and
Punishment in California: The Impact of Three Strikes and You're
Out.' The thesis of the study is that California's Three Strikes law
has failed to deter crime.2 Although it seems counterintuitive to
conclude that increased sentences for habitual criminals do not
have a significant impact on crime, sophisticated statistical
analysis, according to the study's authors, reveals a different reality.
The underlying assumption of this study-and all similar statistical
studies-is that the abstract world of probability is more reliable as
a basis for public policy than experience and common sense.3 It is
as if some pre-Socratic philosopher-perhaps Heraclitus-were to
put forth the paradox that probability is Being. The Zimring report
was widely circulated and received an enthusiastic reception
among the news media. And by the sheerest coincidence, it was
released while an initiative proposal to weaken the Three Strikes
law was under review by the California Secretary of State.4 Final
approval for supporters to begin collecting signatures for the
* Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, California State University, San
Bernadino.
** Professor, Department of Political Science, California State University, San
Bernadino; Member, California State Advisory Commission on Civil Rights; Member,
California Constitutional Revision Commission, 1996.
1. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN CALIFORNIA: THE IMPACT OF
THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT (1999) [hereinafter CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN CALIFORNIA].
2. Id. at 4.
3. In October 1999, Governor Gray Davis stated the common sense of the matter
when he remarked that "no study, or series of studies, can resolve contentious philosophical
and ideological disagreements over the purpose of imprisonment or the appropriate penalty
for repeat felons." Editorial, Law-and-Order Image Is a Davis Priority, S. F. CHRON., Oct. 12,
1999, at A26 (quoting Gov. Gray Davis).
4. Secretary of State, State of California, Restricting Application of Three Strikes Law
to Violent and Serious Felonies (Initiative Statute (2000)).
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initiative was granted on January 3, 2000.1 We believe we have
demonstrated in this article that Zimring, Kamin and Hawkins 6 have
not provided sufficient statistical evidence to prove that Three
Strikes does not deter crime. We do not undertake to demonstrate
that Three Strikes does deter crime; rather, we merely limit our
argument to a critique of Crime and Punishment in California.
Zimring gathered a sample of felony arrests that occurred before
and after the Three Strikes law went into effect in March of 1994.7
The study constructed one pre-Three Strikes sample from April
1993 and two post-Three Strikes samples from April 1994 and April
1995.8 The samples were drawn from three cities: Los Angeles, San
Diego, and San Francisco. These three cities were selected for their
"size and prosecutorial reputation."9 Los Angeles is the "largest
criminological entity" in California.10 San Diego has a reputation for
aggressive prosecution, whereas, San Francisco is infamous for its
leniency."
Within these samples, criminal records were used to identify
those with no strikes, one strike, two strikes, or three strikes. 2 The
pre-Three Strikes sample was a retroactive assignment of strikes. In
constructing the samples, Zirnring conflates arrests with crime; he
assumes that if "persons with a single strike were ten percent of all
felony arrests" then persons with a single strike are responsible for
"ten percent of all felonies committed." 3 Based on this sampling
technique, Zimring addressed the following questions: "[1] how
much crime in California was caused by the specially targeted
groups; [2] how much difference the new law made in criminal
sentences; [3] and whether the new law was responsible for a
significant decline in crime."14
In the pre-Three Strikes (April 1993) sample, Zimring found that
"13.9 percent of adult felony arrests involved the specifically
targeted group, compared to 12.8 percent after the new
5. Bid to Curb 3-Strikes Law OId, SAN DIEGo UNION-TRIBUNE, Jan. 4, 2000, at A3.
6. Hereinafter "Zimring" will be used to identify all three authors of CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN CALIFORNIA.
7. CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN CALFORnIA, supra note 1, at 12.
8. Id. at 13.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 13-16.
12. See CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 1, at 17.
13. Id. at 17-18.
14. Id. at 1.
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punishments were operative."15 While the post-Three Strikes figure
was lower, it was statistically insignificant. The study also makes
the almost incredible discovery that the law had a statistically
meaningless impact on criminal sentences. 6 Finally, Zimring found
no evidence of so-called "spillover effects," a general deterrent
effect on all criminals. 7 Before the law went into effect, 44.8
percent of those arrested had a previous felony conviction, whether
a Three Strikes offense or not. After the law, 45.4 percent of those
arrested had a previous felony conviction. According to Zimring,
the irrefragable conclusion is that:
[t]here is a large gap between the substantial declines in crime
in California that started in 1991 and have continued to 1999
and the detectable impact of three strikes. Whatever has
reduced crime in California over the mid-1990s, it does not
appear that the 1994 legislation played a major role.18
I. ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE OF THE IMPACT OF THREE STRIKES
Many active observers of the California legal system have
tendered a plethora of anecdotal evidence, concerning the
effectiveness of Three Strikes. Gregory Gaines, a two-strike parolee
from Folsom Prison remarked upon his release that "a lot of
people" at Folsom are frightened by the Three Strikes Law. Gaines
said, "I've flipped 100 percent, It's a brand new me, mainly because
of the law. It's going to keep me working, keep my attitude
adjusted."19 Indeed, there is ample qualitative evidence that
parolees are leaving the state in increasing numbers since the
passage of Three Strikes. Before Three Strikes, California was a
magnet for out of state parolees. After Three Strikes, this changed
dramatically; California became a net exporter of paroled felons.
According to Attorney General Dan Lungren "in the last year before
'three strikes' became law in 1994, 226 more paroled felons chose
to move to California than moved out. After 'three strikes' took
effect, the flow reversed: 1,335 more paroled felons chose to leave
California in 1995 than to enter."20 Prosecutors in Los Angeles
routinely report that "felons tell them they are moving out of the
15. Id. at 4.
16. Id. at 42-44.
17. CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN CAIFORNIA, supra note 1, at 4, 69.
18. Id. at 4.
19. Andy Furillo, Future of "Three Strikes" Hinges on Issue of Deterrence,
SACRAMENTo BEE, Apr. 1, 1996, at Al.
20. Dan Lungren, Three Cheers for 3 Strikes, 80 PoL'Y REv. 36 (1996).
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state because they fear getting a second or third strike for a
nonviolent offense."21 Edward R. Jagels, District Attorney for Kern
County, related that "I go to prisons and do classes for inmates on
'three strikes.' There is no other topic of conversation within -the
institutions other than the impact of this statute. 'Am I a
two-striker? Am I a three-striker? What if you've got one of these,
is that a strike?' And they're intently interested in it. Many of them
are talking about moving out of the state."
22
Since the inception of Three Strikes in 1994, 50,967 felons have
been incarcerated as the result of a second or third-strike
conviction.2 Intuitively, the non-statistical mind knows that a
significant amount of crime has been prevented by the enhanced
sentences meted out to a class of habitual criminals. After all, the
unsophisticated mind understands that a criminal behind bars is
not stalking the streets. Zimring, however, has serious doubts about
the conclusions reached by the unsophisticated mind. The
unsophisticated mind is susceptible to self-delusion and too often
mistakes the appearance of things for reality. Thus, according to
Zimring, "a study ought to be done that requires real precision in
definition and measurement that hasn't been applied to crime data
before. What we've been getting instead are after-dinner
speeches."24 Presumably Crime and Punishment in California is
the study that provides the "real precision in definition and
measurement" that was lacking in the "after-dinner-speech" account
of the impact of Three Strikes. But does the report of Zimring
really dispel the common sense understanding that enhanced
punishment does in fact deter crime?
II. STATISTICAL EVIDENCE OF THE IMPACT OF THREE STRIKES ?
While the goal to provide "real precision" is a laudable one,
Crime and Punishment falls woefully short of this goal. One of the
most obvious defects in its research design is the inexact
placement of the longitudinal samples. The Three Strikes law went
into effect in March 1994. Zimring took the first post-Three Strikes
21. Rene Sanchez, A Movement Builds Against Three Strikes' Law, WAsH. POSr, Feb.
18, 2000, at A3.
22. Furillo, supra note 19, at Al.
23. Data supplied to the authors by Laverne Low-Nakashina, Research Program
Specialist, Offender Information Services Branch, Department of Corrections, State of
California, Feb. 2000. See also Sanchez, supra note 21, at A3 ("Few doubt the law's impact.
At last count, nearly 50,000 criminals have received severe sentences under the statute.").
24. Furillo, supra note 19 (quoting Franklin E. Zimring).
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sample from April 1994, only one month after the effective date of
the legislation, and the second sample from April 1995.25 The
conclusion derived from this methodology is that the substantial
declines in California crime that began in 1991 cannot be ascribed
to the impact of Three Strikes legislation.26 To posit the notion that
the law could have had such an immediate effect upon criminal
behavior, however, rests on preposterous assumptions. In an oft
quoted aphorism, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. remarked that "the life
of the law has not been logic: it has been experience."27 Zirning
deliberately minimized the role of "experience" and presupposed
that habitual felons are "logical" and possess "perfect information."
In other words, the Zimring study presupposes that all two and
three-strike-eligible felons had perfect information so that they
became at once rational actors, calculating the full cost-benefit
ratio of any and all future criminal activity on their part. It is an
absurd assumption that information spreads instantly throughout a
community regarding a new policy or that those in charge of
executing a new policy immediately change their old habits.
Ziruring seems not to allow for the well-established lag effect,
which is common in time series studies in economics, political
science, sociology and, presumably, criminal justice. It takes time
for the knowledge and effect of a new policy to work its way
through the system.
By taking samples so soon after the law went into effect, Zimring
set the bar unreasonably high for judging the success or failure of
Three Strikes. The study seems therefore to be designed to show
no effect for the new law-otherwise how can this unorthodox
research design be explained? One is inevitably confronted with the
nagging suspicion that the results would have been different had
the samples been taken in 1997 or 1998. Zirning gave no credible
explanation as to why such a truncated longitudinal data set was
chosen.
As stated above, 50,967 felons have been incarcerated as the
result of a second or third strike since March -1994. Each of them
received the enhanced sentence prescribed by the Three Strikes
law. Several years' experience under the law surely has had some
impact on those in the criminal community who are potential
second and third strike felons. It is illogical to assume that these
25. CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 1, at 13.
26. Id. at 72.
27. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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numbers can remain outside the criminal consciousness forever. Yet
Zimring maintains that "the new penalty threats and new penalties
actually imposed were not an important influence on crime in
California in the mid-1990s."28 The study simply assumes that the
truncated period under examination is a valid extrapolation for the
entire future of the Three Strikes legislation.29 Indeed, Zimring
rashly concludes that "our findings suggest that most of these
crime declines had nothing to do with three strikes."30
From his analysis, Zimruing claims that there was no "three
strikes incapacitation impact in 1994 and 1995."31 This is not a
surprising conclusion because no possible incapacitation effect
could occur before 1997, well outside the time series analyzed by
Zimring. Linda Beres and Thomas Griffith, in a recent law review
article, found that "[a]ny influence of Three Strikes on the drop in
crime from 1994-1996, however, must have resulted from
deterrence alone."32 The reason for their conclusion is simple:
"most offenders imprisoned under Three Strikes would have been
incarcerated during this period even if Three Strikes had never
been enacted."w Their examination of sentencing data reveals that
"even if only the average sentences were imposed, most felons
convicted under Three Strikes in 1994 and early 1995, and all felons
-convicted in 1996 and late 1995, would have been imprisoned until
1997 or longer even without Three Strikes."34  Thus no
incapacitation effect could possibly be detected in the years
Zimring selected for his study. Thus his conclusion that there was
no measurable impact must be considered a revealing anomaly of
28. CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN CAUFORNIA, supra note 1, at 84.
29. Id. at 84.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 73.
32. Linda Beres & Thomas Griffith, Did "Three Strikes" Cause the Recent Drop in
California Crime? An Analysis of the California Attorney General's Report, 32 LoY. LA L
REv. 101, 117 (1998).
33. Id. at 119.
34. Id. at 117-19. See Michael Vitiello, "Three Strikes" and the Romero Case: The
Supreme Court Restores Democracy, 30 Loy. LA. L REv. 1643, 1679 (1997) (reporting that any
decrease in California's crime rate "must be because of the law's deterrent effect, not from
the enhanced prison sentences, since offenders imprisoned under 'three strikes' have yet to
begin serving the enhanced term of years."). See also Daniel Kessler & Steven Levitt, Using
Sentence Enhancements to Distinguish Between Deterrence and Incapacitation, NAT'L
BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH WORKING PAPER No. 6484, 8 (1998) ("The deterrence effect
associated with sentence enhancements increases over time. The explanation for this result
is that initially some of those who could be deterred are incarcerated and therefore cannot
respond to the change in incentives. Over time, those agents will be released from prison
and deterred thereafter.").
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his research strategy.
A similar methodological defect in the study derives from the
statistical conflation of arrests and crime. Zimring notes that "[t]he
strategy of our research design is to use the distribution of felony
arrest rates among different classes of offenders as an estimate of
the share of the crime rate that each group is responsible for
committing." 5 Thus, if ten percent of those arrested already had a
single-strike, Zimring "estimate[ed] that [the single strike arrestees]
are responsible for ten percent of all felonies comnmitted, even
though most reported crimes do not result in an arrest."3 6 Zimring's
explanation for this unorthodox operational definition of crime is
based on the assumption that if ten percent of arrests were for a
particular crime or type of offender, then that is a reasonable
representation of the patterns of actual crime in the community.
37
Some questions, however, are provoked by this sampling method.
It is unreasonable, we believe, to assume that second and
third-strike offenders are arrested at the same rate as those who
are first time perpetrators of crime. While the rate of arrest may be
the same, there is no warrant to conflate the different categories.
Many .of the second and third strike arrestees will have been on
parole and have arrest records that make it easier for the police to
arrest them as suspects. It is virtually certain that two and three
strike felons are arrested at a higher rate than first time
perpetrators. And there may also be a lack of parallelism based on
the type of crime committed-as Zimring admits . 8 Zimring argues
that if there is a bias in this sampling procedure it is a bias that
applies both to pre-Three Strikes and post-Three Strikes samples,
and, therefore, no substantial distortion has occurred in conflating
arrests with crime.39 Zimring concedes, however, that second and
third strike offenders "face larger risks of arrest earlier in their
careers when they are accumulating the conviction records that set
them apart from the others in our sample."
40
An even more serious objection to the conflation of arrest with
crime is the simple fact that arrests do not always occur
immediately after a crime has been committed. It is not uncommon
for an arrest to occur many months--even years-after the fact. It
35. CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 1, at 17.
36. Id. at 18.
37. Id. at 17-18.
38. Id. at 18.
39. Id.
40. CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 1, at 18.
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is almost certain that a percentage of arrests in the two post-Three
Strikes samples involved crimes committed before the enactment of
Three Strikes. How is a potential perpetrator of crime to be
deterred by a law that has yet to be enacted? It seems, in this case
at least, that Zimring assumes more than perfect information on the
part of potential perpetrators. He assumes potential perpetrators
have clairvoyant information. It is our conclusion that there is a
downward bias in the measurement of a Three Strikes deterrent
effect in the post-Three Strikes samples. The severity of the bias
can be determined by the extent to which the post-Three Strikes
samples include crimes committed before the law went into effect.
Unfortunately-but not surprisingly-Zimring does not provide
such data.
The principal conclusion of Zinring is that the Three Strikes
legislation fails to provide any measurable deterrent effect on the
target groups. In coming to this conclusion, Zimring violates the
first principle of policy analysis-that any law or policy must be
understood in terms of its intent. It is a palpable fact that the
California legislature did not intend the principal purpose of the
law to be deterrence, but rather "to ensure longer prison sentences
and greater punishment for those who commit a felony and have
been previously convicted of serious and/or violent felony
offenses."41 Mandatory sentence enhancement and the reduction of
judicial discretion in meting out punishments were the primary
means of effecting this goal. At least one legal scholar has cogently
observed that:
California's three strikes legislation was initiated in response
to two senseless murders committed by recidivists in 1992 and
1993. However, the movement itself had been long in the
making. Throughout the country, many people lived in fear of
rising crime rates, senseless gang-related crimes, children
carrying guns, crimes committed by recidivists, and children
being targeted by drug dealers. The public blamed sentencing
procedures and judicial discretion for allowing violent
criminals to walk free.4
2
41. CAL PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West 1988 & Supp. 1998); See Lisa Cowart, Comment,
Legislative Prerogative vs. Judicial Discretion: California's Three Strikes Law Takes a Hit,
47 DEPAuL L REV. 615, 620-21, 626 (1998) (Stating that the Three Strikes law "was
unquestionably aimed at enhancing mandatory sentences for convicted criminals with a
history of serious or violent felony convictions. Furthermore, it was designed to provide a
'no questions asked' policy in sentencing a career criminal to life imprisonment for his or her
third felony conviction.").
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Zimring analyzes the law as if its purpose were deterrence alone,
this inevitably distorts the phenomenon under consideration. The
legislative goal was to punish recidivist criminals. No one can
possibly deny that the Three Strikes law has fulfilled its legislative
purpose. Any criticism of the law's lack of deterrent effect-even if
true-is beside the point. Several studies have shown that a
fraction of the population is responsible for an overwhelming
majority of crime.43 Consequently, it is certain that if a greater
percentage of that small fraction is incarcerated for long periods,
the crime rate will decline at a steadily increasing rate.
III. Is THERE EVIDENCE OF DETERRENCE?
Zimring maintains that the Three Strikes law has no measurable
deterrent effect on crime.44 He notes that crime in California began
to decline in 1991, well before the advent of Three Strikes. 45
Moreover, Zimring contends that, while the decline continued after
the effective date of Three Strikes, there is no evidence of any
increase in the rate of decline after 1994.46 "The drop in crime
levels is just as abrupt prior to the effective date of the legislation,"
Zimring argues, "as at any time after the new law took effect. So
the effective date is not a marker for either a beginning or an
intensification of a crime rate decline."47 Zimring does, however,
inject an involuntary caveat into his assurances that Three Strikes
has had no general deterrent effect by stating that:
On the other hand, the majority of the crime reduction that
has occurred in California has happened since the new law
came into effect, and there is no guarantee that the decline
42. Cowart, supra note 41, at 626 (citations omitted); see generally Vitiello, supra
note 34, passim for an exhaustive history of the politics surrounding the passage of Three
Strikes.
43. See, e.g, PAUL E. TRACY RT AL, DELINQUENCY CAREERS IN Two BIRTI COHORTS (1990);
MARVIN WOLFGANG & PAUL TRACY, THE 1945 AND 1958 COHORTS, presented at the Conference on
"Public Danger. Dangerous Offenders and the Criminal Justice System," Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University, Feb. 11-12, 1982; ROBERT TILLMAN, PREVALENCE AND INCIDENCE
OF ARRESTS AMONG ADULT MALES IN CALIFORNIA, BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS AND SPECIAL
SERVICES, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; MARK PETERSON ET AL, DOING CRIME: A SURVEY OF
CALIFORNIA PRISON INMATES, RAND CORPORATION STUDY NUMBER R-2200-DOJ. These sources were
brought to the attention of the. authors by Patrick A. Langan, Senior Statistician, Bureau of
Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice.
44. CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 1, at 4.
45. Id. at 69.
46. Id. at 72.
47. Id. at 69.
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that started in the early 1990s would have persisted in the
pattern observed without the effect of the new legislation. So
the lack of a tight fit between the start of California's crime
decline and the three strikes era is neither a' proof nor a
decisive rejection of a three strike theory of crime rate
decline.48
A cursory examination of the aggregate statistics from the FBI's
Uniform Crime Reports ("UCR") suggests that the reservations
expressed in this caveat are well-founded. The data listed in the
statistical tables included at the end of this article demonstrates
that the rate of decline in crime for the entire State of California
and for most of its metropolitan areas was significantly greater
after the Three Strikes law went into effect. In using the UCR data,
the pre-Three Strikes statistics were calculated from 1992-1993
because crime in California began to decline in October 1991. The
post-Three Strikes statistics were calculated from the years
1995-1998. 49 The mean rate of change for Total Crime, Violent
Crime, and Homicide were calculated for both time periods. Table
1 presents the Mean Annual Rate of Change in the Total Crime
Index for 1992-1998. For the entire State of California, the
pre-Three Strikes rate of decline for 1992-1993 in the Total Crime
Index was 2.35 percent. The post-Three Strikes rate of decline for
1995-1998 was 8.39 percent. These figures represent a marked
acceleration in the rate of decline for the post-Three Strikes years.
A simple difference of means analysis employing a straightforward
t test reveals at the very minimum, that this acceleration in the rate
of decline is statistically significant at the 99.5 percent level of
probability:
48. Id.
49. Data from 1994 was excluded because the law went into effect in March of 1994.
Part of the year fell into the new Three Strikes regime and part of the year did not. In order
to take into account any potential lag effects, 1994 was not included.
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t = C , -x2)
Where
2 I- ( 2 2
n, + n2- 2"
Where
S = Variance of Pre-Three Strikes Rate of Change
2 = Variance of Post-Three Strikes Rate of Change
x, = Pre-Three Strikes Mean Rate of Change
x2= Post-Three Strikes Mean Rate of Change
n,= Number of Years in Pre-Three Strikes Sample
n2= Number of Years in Post-Three Strikes Sample
Table 2 exhibits the Mean Annual Rate of Change in the Violent
Crime Index for 1992-1998. As was the case with the Total Crime
Index, the rate of decline for violent crime was sharper after Three
Strikes than before. In the pre-Three Strikes period, the rate of
decline was 0.50 percent; whereas, in the post-Three-Strikes period,
the rate was 8.66 percent. A t test analysis results in the same 99.5
level of significance.
Table 3 presents the mean annual rate of change in the Homicide
Rate for 1992-1998. For the entire State of California the
pre-Three-Strikes rate of change in the Homicide Rate was a 1.57
percent increase. This runs counter to the impression left by
Zimring that crime has been in a steady decline since 1991. The
post-Three Strikes figure for 1995-1998, however, is a dramatic
13.36 percent decline in the Homicide Rate. A t test reveals that
this decline is statistically significant at the 99.5 percent level of
2000
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probability. This is irrefutable evidence, not of a mere steady
decline in crime rates, but of a precipitous and dramatic decline.50
Zimring admits that "properly cautious interrupted time series
analysis would require a distinct and sharp downward slope in
crime rate proximate to the new penal regime before concluding
that crime reductions were a result of increased deterrence."5' We
have proven, however, from the above data, that a "distinct and
sharp" decline did indeed occur after the Three Strikes legislation
went into effect.
It is a matter of some curiosity that Zinring could not find a
general deterrent effect that matched his own criterion. It is a
further matter of curiosity that Zimring, in a piece entitled Crime
and Punishment in California, did not collect a single datum that
was statewide in scope. In constructing a figure that represented
statewide criminal activity, Zimring used data only from the ten
most populous cities and discontinued the analysis in 1996 even
though data was available for 1997-98.52 One is left to wonder
whether the data from 1997-98, if included in their time series,
might have proved embarrassing to the Zimring thesis, as our
figures indicate that they may have.
IV. PROSPECTS FOR THREE STRIKEs REFORM
Support for Three Strikes continues to be very strong among
both Democratic and Republican politicians. These politicians are
merely responding to the widespread public perception that Three
Strikes is the major factor in the dramatic downward spiral in
crime rates during the previous decade. Most academic scholarship,
on the other hand, stridently opposes the Three Strikes regime.
Indeed, much of the opposition must be described as somewhat
frantic. Professor Michael Vitiello, for example, argues that the
passage of Three Strikes represents the failure of democracy,
because it "passed as a result of public panic, flamed by politicians
who spurned rational debate."53 "While many tout the initiative
50. Homicide statistics are the most reliable because homicides "almost always are
reported to the police due to the seriousness of the crime." Linda S. Beres & Thomas D.
Griffith, Do Three Strikes Laws Make Sense? Habitual Offender Statutes and Criminal
Incapacitation, 87 GEo. L.J. 103, 105 n.13 (1998). If homicide rates are the most reliable
crime statistics, then the results of Table 3 are particularly troublesome for the Zirnring
thesis.
51. CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 1, at 11.
52. Id. at 68.
53. Vitiello, supra note 34, at 1652.
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process as democracy in action," Vitiello writes, "politicians
extravagant rhetoric prevented the electorate from making a fully
informed decision on 'three strikes.' "5 Indeed, Zimring laments the
"populism" of Three Strikes legislation because, in its zeal to
punish recidivist criminals, the public did not defer to "criminal
justice experts." In a revealing statement Zimring posits that:
[iut may be that the social authority accorded criminal justice
experts provided insiilation between populist sentiments
(always punitive) and criminal justice policies at the
legislative, administrative, and judicial levels. This insulation
prevented the direct domination of policy by anti-offender
sentiments that are consistently held by most citizens at most
times . . . . Three Strikes was an extreme, but by no means
isolated, example of the kind of law produced when very little
mediates anti-offender sentiments.5
Both Vitiello and Zimring place ultimate blame for the "irrational"
character of Three Strikes on the initiative process that produced
it. 4 Such fundamiental issues as "crime and punishment" should be
left to experts, not "soundbite populism" or "direct popular
pressures."57 Zimring concludes that in the area of criminal justice
the public has grown to distrust the .experts.5s But, he argues that it
is the experts who stand as mediators between the uninformed
public with its "anti-offender sentiments" and sound policymaking.59
"[T]he decline of expert authority is a social circumstance that
makes responsible policy more difficult to achieve. It is not an
excuse for abandoning the criminal justice system to populist
preemption."6°
54. Id. See Michael Vitiello & Andrew J. Glendon, Symposium on the California
Initiative Process: Article III Judges and the Initiative Process: Are Article III Judges
Hopelessly Elitist? 31 Loy. LA. L REv. 1275 (1998) (arguing that the California initiative
process rarely reflects the true will of the majority because of misrepresentation and the
ambiguous language of initiatives).
55. Franklin E. Zimring, Populism, Democratic Government, and the Decline of
Expert Authority: Some Reflections on 'Three Strikes' in California, 28 PAc. LJ. 243, 255
(1996).
56. Id.; Vitiello, supra note 34, at 1652.
57. Zinring, supra note 55, at 255.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 255. We will not quibble with Zinuing about the definition of "expertise" but
merely point out that the Three Strikes initiative was originally drafted by a California Court
of Appeals Judge in consultation with other judges. Vitiello, supra note 34, at 1654. Zimring,
no doubt, would reply that their legal experience notwithstanding, these judges could not be
criminal justice experts because they displayed "anti-offender sentiments." "Expertise" is,
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Until the rule of experts replaces democracy, however, radical
reformers are confined by the forms of democracy. Currently,
signatures are being gathered to qualify an initiative that would
ameliorate the "anti-offender sentiments" embodied in the Three
Strikes law.61 This initiative provides that sentence enhancements
will be applied only for a "serious or violent felony such as rape,
robbery or burglary."62 It also provides for retroactive re-sentencing
for "persons currently sentenced pursuant to 'Three Strikes' law if
the offense for which they were sentenced or prior convictions
used to increase their sentences do not qualify under this measure
as serious or violent felonies."6 Thus, the proposed initiative
addresses the most frequently voiced criticisms of criminal justice
experts-that the California Three Strikes law allows a third strike
to be earned by a non-violent or non-serious felony and thus
imposes disproportionate punishment for the commission of these
"lesser" or "trivial" felonies. As Zinring has explained, "[a]ny trivial
felony by a twice-convicted burglar will call down a larger sentence
for a three-time loser than a nonaggravated second-degree murder
will generate for a non-three-strikes defendant."M Professor Lisa
Cowart reports that "only fifteen percent were sentenced for
violent crimes, and six percent were sentenced for serious crimes.
Thus, a disproportionate eighty percent of criminals sentenced
under three strikes law were incarcerated for nonviolent crimes.
The majority of nonviolent criminals sentenced under three strikes
laws are drug users and petty thieves."6
Some commentators have argued that this "disproportionality"
violates federal and state prohibitions against "cruel and unusual
punishment." Both the United States Constitution and the California
Constitution forbid criminal penalties that are "grossly
disproportionate" to the crime.6 This is a simple recognition of "a
precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated
and proportioned to the offense."67 In 1980, the United States
therefore, to be understood exclusively in ideological terms.
61. See Bid, supra note 5.
62. Id. at A3.
63. Id.
64. Zimring, supra note 55, at 248.
65. Cowart, supra note 41, at 658.
66. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII; CAL CONsT. art. I, § 17. A curious difference between the
Eighth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution and the corresponding California Constitution
provision should be noted: The Eighth Amendment forbids "cruel and unusual punishment"
whereas the California Constitution refers to "cruel or unusual punishment."
67. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
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Supreme Court explained this "precept" in Rummel v. Estelle.68 The
Court stated that, "one could argue without fear of contradiction by
any decision of this Court that for crimes concededly classified and
classifiable as felonies, that is, as punishable by significant terms of
imprisonment in a state penitentiary, the length of the sentence
actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative."69 In
Rummel, the petitioner had received a mandatory life sentence
under a Texas state "recidivist statute" for non-violent felonies and
was eligible at some point for parole consideration. 70
Three years later, however, the Court in Solem v. Helm71
significantly qualified its willingness to defer to "legislative
prerogative."72 The Court argued that the statement in Rummel
quoted above was merely a speculative one ("one could argue...")
and not a necessary part of the holding.73 The Court argued that a
mandatory life sentence without possibility of parole as punishment
for seven non-violent felonies was "significantly
disproportionate . . . and is therefore prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment."74 The Court did concede, however, that "[r]eviewing
courts . . . should grant substantial deference to the broad
authority that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the
types and limits of punishments for crimes, as well as to the
discretion that trial courts possess in sentencing convicted
criminals. But no penalty is per se constitutional."
75
The Court is substantially divided on the question of how much
deference should be granted to legislatures. This is evidenced by its
fractured opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan.76 Justice Scalia,
announcing the judgment of the Court and writing an opinion
joined only by the Chief Justice, observed that "[i]t should be
apparent ... that our 5-to-4 decision eight years ago in Solem was
scarcely the expression of clear and well accepted constitutional
law .... Solem was simply wrong; the Eighth Amendment contains
no proportionality guarantee."r7 In. Harmelin, the "[p]etitioner was
convicted of possessing 672 grams of cocaine and sentenced to a
68. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
69. Id. at 274.
70. Id. at 266.
71. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
72. Id. at 289.
73. Id. at 307.
74. Id. at 303.
75. Id. at 290 (footnotes omitted).
76. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
77. Id. at 965.
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mandatory term of life in prison without possibility of parole." 8
The petitioner argued that the mandatory sentence violated the
"cruel and unusual punishment" provision of the Eight Amendment
because it did not allow the consideration of "mitigating
circumstances." 79 The mitigating circumstance proffered by the
petitioner was his lack of prior felony convictions.80 Justice Scalia
concluded that "[slevere, mandatory penalties may be cruel, but
they are not unusual in the constitutional sense, having been
employed in various forms throughout our Nation's history."8 1 This
statement reaffirms at least one strain of the Solem decision where
the Court noted that " '[o]utside the context of capital punishment,
successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences
[will be] exceedingly rare.' This does not mean, however, that
proportionality analysis is entirely inapplicable in noncapital
cases."8 2 Furthermore, Scalia noted that, "a State is justified in
punishing a recidivist more severely than it punishes a first
offender."8
Under Three Strikes, no one can be sentenced to an
indeterminate life sentence without having committed at least two
serious or violent felonies.84 This fact would make it extremely
unlikely that an application of the Solem factors would result in a
finding of disproportionality.85 The fact that a third strike can be
earned by "non-serious" or "trivial" felonies is wholly irrelevant to
proportionality review. Given the fact that California courts have
repeatedly affirmed that the principal target of Three Strikes is the
recidivist offender,86  one cannot imagine the grounds for
invalidating the legislation under current Supreme Court doctrine.
In denying a challenge to. Three Strikes because the third strike
was "essentially a minor shoplifting and a 'wobbler' which could
have been prosecuted as a misdemeanor,"7 the California court of
appeal stressed the "[a]ppellant's recidivism"81 and the fact that
78. Id. at 961.
79. Id. at 1006.
80. See id. at 1025.
81. Harmelin, 507 U.S. at 994-95.
82. Solem, 463 U.S. at 289-90 (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272).
83. Id. at 296.
84. CAL PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A) (West 1998 & Supp. 1998).
85. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 307.
86. People v. Deloza, 957 P.2d 945, 950 (Cal. 1998).
87. People v. Goodwin, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 576, 581-82 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
88. Id. at 582.
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"[pIrior attempts at rehabilitation and deterrence have failed."89
Three members of the United States Supreme Court, Justices
Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg, have recently expressed their
concerns about the California legislation on Solem grounds. In
Riggs v. California,90 a case in which a criminal was assigned a
third strike for stealing a bottle of vitamins, a crime that was
described as "a petty theft motivated by homelessness and
hunger,"91 the three justices joined in a denial of certiorari.9 2 Justice
Stevens conceded that "[i]f this had been petitioner's first offense,
it would have been treated as a misdemeanor punishable by fine or
a jail sentence of six months or less."93 He further noted that "[tihis
question is obviously substantial, particularly since California
appears to be the only State in which a misdemeanor could receive
such a severe sentence."9 4 Stevens did explain, however, that "this
Court has traditionally accorded to state legislatures considerable
(but not unlimited) deference to determine the length of sent-
ences 'for crimes concededly classified and classifiable
as felonies.' "95 Petty theft, Justice Stevens admitted, "does not
appear to fall into that category."96 Nevertheless, Justice Stevens
recognized that, in light of the Court's consistent pronouncements
that States can punish recidivists more severely than first time
offenders, "there is some uncertainty about how our cases dealing
with the punishment of recidivists should apply."
97
In People v. Garcia,98 however, the California Supreme Court
ruled that judges have the discretion to strike "prior conviction
allegations with respect to a relatively minor current felony."99 The
court concluded that this discretion was authorized by Section 1385
of the California Penal Code'00 which allows judges to act "in the
89. Id.
90. 119 S.Ct. 890 (1999).
91. Id. at 891 (citation omitted).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 891.
94. Id.
95. Riggs, 119 S. Ct. at 891(quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274).
96. Riggs, 119 S. Ct. at 891.
97. Id. See Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 26-28 (1992) ("Statutes that punish recidivists
more severely than first offenders have a long tradition in this country that dates back to
colonial times ... 'Tolerance for a spectrum of state procedures dealing with [recidivism] is
especially appropriate' given the high rate of recidivism and the diversity of approaches that
States have developed for addressing it" (quoting Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 566 (1967)).
98. 976 P.2d 831 (Cal. 1999).
99. Id. at 836.
100. Id. at 834.
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furtherance of justice."10 1 Surely, in light of Garcia, even Justice
Stevens' concerns should be considerably allayed. It is unlikely that
the present Supreme Court will hold the California Three Strikes
law to be a violation of the Eight Amendment's proscription on
"cruel and unusual punishment," and any assertion that the law is a
violation of the Eighth Amendment, both facially and as applied, is
merely an undifferentiated expression of anti-"anti-offender" ire.102
The fact that the California legislature-and the people of
California through the initiative process-have deemed it necessary
to treat habitual criminals by a different standard hardly provokes
any claim of disproportionality that would offend the prohibition
against cruel or unusual punishment103 California Secretary of State
Bill Jones, who as a member of the California Assembly was a
principal author of the Three Strikes Bill, stated in 1995 that:
Three Strikes is an anti-crime law, not just an anti-violent
crime law. It was our intent in enacting Three Strikes, not only
to keep dangerous repeat felons in prison (that is why the
third strike can be any felony), but also to begin moving
toward the concept of zero tolerance for crime.1°4
This statement expresses both the legislative intent and the
legislative competence to enact the criminal justice regime of Three
Strikes.
V. THE ROMERO DECISION
Professor Vitiello argues that in People v. Superior Court
("Romero'D10 5 "the court has given California the opportunity to
correct its excesses. Rather than frustrating democracy, the court
has given the legislature an opportunity to bring rationality back to
California's sentencing policy."0 Professor Vitiello quotes Judge
Mudd, the trial judge in Romero: "[Jiudges are the conscience of
the community and should be free to evaluate what type of
sanction is appropriate." 07 This is precisely the kind of judicial
attitude that the Three Strikes legislation was designed to curtail.
101. CAL PENAL CODE § 1385(a) (WEsT 1999).
102. See generally Albert Menaster, Eighteen Ways to Avoid Three Strikes, 26 U. WEST
LA L REv. 243, 299-301 (1995).
103. See Vitiello, supra note 34, at 1646-47.
104. Bill Jones, Three Strikes and You're Out, 26 U. WEsT LA L REV. 243, 245 (1995).
105. 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996).
106. Vitiello, supra note 34, at 1653; see also Cowart, supra note 41, at 666.
107. Vitiello, supra note 34, at 1649 n.21.
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Proponents argued that the initiative would limit the discretion of
"soft-on-crime judges... [who] care more about violent felons than
they do victims." 08 Judge Mudd would have been on solid ground
had he said that the judiciary is the conscience of the constitution
or the rule of law. And, had Judge Mudd further understood the
word "conscience" in its original meaning-with knowledge-it
would have been an unremarkable statement because in the system
of separated powers each branch has a constitutional obligation to
guard the constitution against encroachments of the other
branches. The constitution is superior law-it is organic law-and
any attempt on the part of the legislative, executive, or judicial
branch to overstep its constitutional bounds must be opposed by
one or more branches-and ultimately by the people. 10 9
At trial, Judge Mudd had, sua sponte and in clear violation of the
Three Strikes law, struck a prior felony over the objections of the
prosecutor. °10 This allowed the defendant to escape a mandatory
third strike sentence."' In Romero, the California Supreme Court
was confronted with the question of whether the Three Strikes
legislation which allows the dismissal of a prior felony conviction
only on the motion of the prosecuting attorney violates separation
of powers.12 Three Strikes had provided that "[t]he prosecuting
attorney may move to dismiss or strike a prior felony conviction
allegation in the furtherance of justice pursuant to Section 1385.""
13
Section 1385(a) of the Penal Code had previously provided that
"[t]he judge or magistrate may, either of his or her own motion or
upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in the
furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed."' 4 Having
determined that requiring the prosecutor's approval of the court's
dismissal would present serious constitutional issues, the court
attempted to adopt a valid construction of Section 667(f)(2) that
would not pose constitutional concerns."5 The question, therefore,
108. BALLOr PAMPHLET, REBUTIrAL TO THE ARGUMENT AGAINST PROPOSITION 184, 37 (Nov. 8,
1994).
109. See ERLER, THE AMERICAN PoLITY: ESSAYS ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 39-57, 59-89 (1991); Erler, Judicial Legislation, reprinted in L
LEVY, ET. AL, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 3:104043 (1986).
110. See Vitiello, supra note 34, at 1649 n.21.
111. See Romero, 917 P2d at 632.
112. Id. at 633. The court found that if California Penal Code § 667(0(2) was construed
to permit the court to exercise discretion to dismiss only with the prosecutor's consent, it
would violate the separation of powers doctrine. Id.
113. CAL PENAL CODE § 667(f)(2) (West 1998 & Supp. 1998).
114. CAL PENAL CODE § 1385(a) (West 1998 & Supp. 1998).
115. Romero, 917 P.2d at 634.
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became whether Three Strikes, in its attempt to curtail judicial
discretion, had repealed section 1385.116 The court reasoned that
there was no clear evidence that repeal was any part of the intent
of Three Strikes; indeed the fact that the prosecutor could move-to
dismiss pursuant to 1385 was an indication that the intent was to
retain that section.1 '7 The court reasoned that "we cannot conclude
that the Three Strikes law discloses a 'clear legislative direction'
eliminating the court's power to act on its own motion pursuant to
section 1385."118
The court did concede, however, that "the judicial power to
reduce a defendant's sentence by striking a sentencing allegation in
furtherance of justice is statutory. Because the power is statutory,
the Legislature may eliminate it."" 9 In other words, a court's power
to strike a prior felony conviction in "the furtherance of justice" is
not a power that is "inherent" in the judiciary, but only a statutory
creation. If a court has "the power to strike ... an allegation on its
own motion . . . the power must be granted in a statute, either
expressly or by implication. This is because . . . the court has no
such extra-statutory power."120 Once the power is granted, however,
as it was in section 1385, then the exercise of that power cannot be
conditioned by the approval of the prosecuting attorney without
violating the constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers.'
The legislature does not have to grant statutory authority to the
judiciary to "act in the furtherance of justice," but once it does it
cannot make that judicial power depend upon or be conditioned by
actions of the executive branch:
[D]ismissal-for whatever reason-is a judicial rather than an
executive function .... That the Legislature and the electorate
may eliminate the courts' power to make certain sentencing
choices may be conceded .... It does not follow, however,
that having given the court the power to dismiss, the
Legislature may therefore "condition its exercise upon the
approval of the district attorney."1'
The court did caution, however, that the "[tirial court's power to
116. See id. at 640.
117. Id. at 641-42.
118. Id. at 646.
119. Romero, 917 P.2d at 640.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 638.
122. Id. at 638 (quoting People v. Navarro, 7 Cal.3d. 248, 260 (1972).
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dismiss an action under section 1385, while broad, is by no means
absolute. Rather it is limited by the amorphous concept which
requires that the dismissal be in furtherance of justice."13 "[T]his
requires a consideration both of the constitutional rights of the
defendant, and the interests of society represented by the People."
At a bare minimum, the dismissal must be "reasonable."1 24 Any
dismissal motivated by "judicial convenience" or to relieve "court
congestion," or as a reward for a guilty plea or simple "antipathy
for the effect that the three stikes law would have on [a]
defendant" .would be "unreasonable" and therefore not in
"furtherance of justice." 25 But it is the purpose of the law that
governs the use of judicial discretion-the power to act in "the
furtherance of justice"-not some amorphous and constitutionally
unrecognized duty to act as the "conscience of the community."
The court's statutory construction, although somewhat abstruse
and labored, is defensible. The telling point is that Three Strikes
allows the prosecutor to move to strike in the furtherance of
justice under 1385. Yet if the judge had no power to act under
1385-as if Three Strikes had repealed 1385-Three Strikes would
merely authorize the prosecutor to ask the judge for what he
cannot grant.126 As the court sardonically remarked, "[n]o rational
drafter would give the prosecutor express permission to bring a
motion the court may not grant."1 27 At least one commentator, after
remarking that "the court's statutory construction is certainly open
to question," argues that "more importantly, six justices agreed that
had the legislature denied judges' discretion, the statute would
violate the separation of powers doctrine."128 But, of course, the
court explicitly stated that the power to dismiss was statutory, not
constitutional. 29 The court was emphatic in arguing that the power
to act "in the furtherance of justice" was not an inherent or
intrinsic part of "judicial power." 30 The irrefragable conclusion
must be that what the legislature gives it can take away without
violating the separation of powers. The separation of powers
argument made its appearance in Romero only as an argument
123. Romero, 917 P.2d at 648.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 646.
127. Id. at 640.
128. Vitiello, supra note 34, at 1649.




against the legislature's attempt to condition a grant of judicial
power on the actions of the executive branch. 13' Presumably, if the
legislature wanted to eliminate the courts' power to strike prior
convictions-and did so in clear and unequivocal terms-then the
Romero court would find no separation of powers violations for the
simple reason that they held that the power to dismiss was a
judicial power, but it was not inherent in the judiciary.
132
The holding in Romero has generally been misstated by
commentators. Professor Lisa Cowart, for example, remarks that
"California's three strikes law completely removed judicial
discretion in sentencing. Romero's holding affords a necessary
return to that historical principle. Therefore, Romero must be
viewed as an opportunity to actively pursue sentencing alternatives
to incarceration.""" But the Three Strikes law, as construed by the
court, was said not to be an explicit or clear delimitation of judicial
discretion. Romero is not a return to "historic principle," if "historic
principle" is meant to refer to an inherent power to dismiss on the
part of the judiciary. This interpretation was confirmed in Garcia.'4
Justice Chin, writing the opinion of the court, remarked that:
Our holding in Romero flowed directly from the plain language
of the Three Strikes law, which expressly authorizes
prosecutors to move to strike prior allegations "pursuant to"
section 1385 .... We reasoned that, because the Three Strikes
law makes express reference to section 1385 and does not
anywhere bar courts from acting pursuant to that section, the
drafters of the law must have intended that section to apply
without limitation in Three Strikes cases." 35
The Garcia court took very seriously Romero's warning that
discretion is limited to fulfilling "the purpose of the Three Strikes
law."' 36 Under Garcia, there is absolutely no warrant for predicting
that courts will move to implement "alternatives to incarceration."
One unintended-if perhaps maliciously ironic-consequence of
Romero is to provide some insulation against due process
challenges. Judicial discretion softens the mandatory aspect of
sentencing that might otherwise provoke due process
131. See id. at 638.
132. Id.
133. See Cowart, supra note 43, at 663.
134. See Garcia, 976 P.2d at 835.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 839.
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considerations. 13 7
CONCLUSION
From all available evidence it seems clear beyond cavil that
Three Strikes is not only an effective deterrent to crime, but that it
is likely to survive any constitutional challenge. It is unlikely that
the current legislature will act to curtail judicial discretion, and
perhaps it would be politically unwise to do so. Three Strikes is a
much more defensible law after Romero's construction. Crime rates
continue to fall at a precipitous rate as prison populations soar.
Rather than tamper with judicial discretion, the legislature may
want to consider revising the Three Strikes law to a Two Strikes
law while including only serious or violent felonies on the list of
strike eligible crimes. This would avoid the problem expressed in
Justice Stevens' Riggs opinion of having the third strike triggered
by a "minor" felony or a misdemeanor that is elevated to a felony
because of prior strikes.138 There is little doubt that a Two Strikes
law would be constitutional, especially if it included judicial
discretion to strike prior felonies under Section 1385. After all,
"three strikes" is a baseball metaphor; it has no constitutional
status.
137. See Erler, Transcript: The Fourth Driker Forum for Excellence in the Law, 45
WAYNE L REv. 1412-17 (1999).
138. See Riggs, 119 S. Ct. at 891.
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Figure 1. Number of Inmates in California Prisons
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Table I. Mean Annual Rate of Change, Total Crime Index,
Before and After Three Strikes
(rates are listed as percent figures)
Pro- Post- I t
Area 3 Strikes 3 Strikes Score Significance
California -2.35 -8.39 4.07 99.5
Bakersfield -0.17 -6.37 1.74 90.0
Chico +2.44 -4.55 1.50 not significant
Fresno -5.64 -8.97 1.09 not significant
Los Angeles -3.83 -9.33 2.76 95.0
Merced +10.30 -I .82 4.29 99.5
Modesto +4.63 .5.15 2.17 95.0
Orange County -4.23 -11.85 4.50 99.5
Oakland -0.28 .3.52 0.74 not significant
Redding +0.74 -5.15 0.82 not significant
RiversideSan Bern. -3.38 -10.87 2.25 95.0
Sacramento .1 17 7.52 1.25 not significant
Santa Barbara 0.99 -7.67 2.22 95.0
Santa Crz +1.49 -10.17 3.41 97.5
San Diego -4.94 -8.99 2.02 90.0
San Francisco -0.59 -6.89 2.95 97.5
San Jose 4.01 -6.13 1.33 not significant
Salinas +2.45 4.71 1.65 90.0
Santa Roa +3.21 -5.69 1.97 90.0
Ventura County -6.27 .7.48 0.59 not significant
Vatlejo-Fairfield-Napa -1.20 .6.83 2.00 90.0
Visalia -1.65 -3.83 0.87 not significant
Yuba City +6.07 -10.78 4.08 99.5
Source: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. UNIFORM CRIME REPORT. 1992-1998.
Note: The metropolitan areas listed are Statistical Metropolitan Areas as defined by the United States Census Bureau.
Note: The pe- and post-law valus were compared using a one-tailed t- test. The levels of significance expessed
in the table are multiples of 100 from the probability complement of the p-value of the t-statistic calculated
in each case. The higher the number, the more certain we are of effect of the Three Strikes law. Cases that are
labeled "Not Significant" did not yield t-seores that allow us to say. with any confidence, that there is an effect
from the Three Strikes law.
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Table 2. Mean Annual Rate of Change, Violent Crime Index,
Before and After Three Strikes
(rates are listed as percent figures)
Pro- Post- t t
Area 3 Strikes 3 Strikes Score Significance
California .0.50 -8.66 3.93 99.5
Bakersfield -1.15 -9.00 1.29 not significant
Chico -1.54 -8.47 0.92 not significant
Fresno +3,08 -7.96 4.43 99.0
Los Angeles -3.19 -9-20 3.58 97.5
Merced +16.36 8.26 0.55 not significant
Modesto +11.31 -6.30 6.23 99.5
Orange County -2.80 -10.68 2.84 97.5
Oakland +4.75 4.77 2.63 95.0
Redding .7.76 +6.20 0.18 not significant
RiversideSan Bern. -3.95 .10.41 5.32 99.5
Sacramento +0.71 -8.18 2.33 95.0
Santa Barbara +2.23 +0.40 0.69 not significant
Santa Cruz +17.18 -5.06 4.11 99.0
San Diego -4.78 -9.11 1.97 90.0
San Francisco +530 -8.84 4.81 99.5
San Jose +0.23 -3.47 0.69 nor significant
Salinas +8.41 -5.23 1.88 90.0
Santa Rosa +8.81 -7.87 5.46 99.5
Venturae County -2.52 -9.35 1.45 not significant
Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa +2.59 -3.87 !.03 nor significant
Visalia -6.96 -1.64 -1.24 not significant
Yba City .6.07 -10.78 1.60 90.0
Source: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION. U S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. UNIFORM CRIME REPORT. 1992-199.
Note: The metropolitan areas listed ae Statistical Metropolitan Areas as defined by the United States Census Bureau.
Note: The pe- and post-law ralues were compared using a one-tailed t- test. The levels of significance expressed
in the table are multiptes of 100 from the probability cotiplemient ofthe p-value of the t-statistic callatiel
in each case. The higher the number, the more certain we are of effect of the Three Strikes law. Cases that are
labeled "Not Significant" did nt yield I-scores that allow us to say, with any confidence, that there is an effect
from the Three Strikes law.
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Table 3. Mean Annual Rate of Change, Homicides,
Before and After Three Strikes
(rates are listed aspercent figures)
Pro. Post- t I
Area 3 Strikes 3 Strikes Score Significance
California .1.57 -13.36 4.46 99.5
Bakersfield +10.68 -12.06 1.63 90.0
Chico *15,67 +9.01 -0.72 not significant
Fresno +21.82 -17.15 4.09 99.0
L. Angeles +1.93 -12.60 3.00 97.5
Merced +70.85 +12.82 1.62 90.0
Modesto +8.87 -2.36 0.57 not significant
Orange County +11.28 .17.02 4.06 99.0
Oakland +0.06 -15.61 3.43 97.5
Redding +7.59 .11.87 1.57 90.0
RiversideSan Bern. +8.96 -13.31 17.24 99.5
Sacramento +13.36 -12.56 1.89 99.0
Sant Barbara -18.15 -0.39 .2.87 not significant
Santa Cruz -1.17 +28. It -0.67 not significant
San Diego -7.47 -19.04 1.71 90.0
Sa Francisco +5.69 -7.86 1.17 not significant
San Jose -10.55 -4.36 -0.45 not significant
Salinas +12.81 -5.21 0.99 not significant
SontaRosa +112.29 -12.01 1.92 90.0
Ventura County +10.12 -3.20 0.81 not significant
Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa -7.11 -23.20 1.41 not significant
Visalia -11.16 -12.02 0.05 not significant
Yuba City -34.59 +2.39 -1.91 not sigificant
SotrCe: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION. U . DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. UNIFORM CRIME REPORT, 1992-199.
Note: The metropolitan areas listed are Statistical Metropolitan Areas as defi.d by the United States Census Bureau.
Note: The pe- and post-law vluces were compared using a one-tailed t- test. The levels of significance expressed
in the table are multiples of 100 from the probability complement of the p-value of the t-statistic calculated
in each case. The higher the number. the more certain we are of effect of the Three Strikes law. Cases that ore
labeled "Not Significant" did notyield t-scores that allow us to ay, with acy confidence, that here is an effect
front the Three Strikes taw.

